ABSTRACT: As an alternative way to shed light on the debate over whether accruals quality is a priced risk factor, we examine the effect of seasonality on the pricing of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality measure (AQ). We find that (1) high AQ stocks outperform low AQ stocks only in January; (2) during the rest of the calendar year, high AQ firms underperform low AQ firms such that there is no AQ premium on an annual basis; (3) about half of the January AQ premium occurs during the first five trading days of January; (4) a January AQ premium is observed in almost every year of our sample period; and (5) the January AQ premium reflects, at least partly, the stock price effects of tax loss selling around the turn of the year. Taken together, these findings are difficult to reconcile with a risk interpretation of accruals quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
W hether information risk independently affects a firm's cost of equity capital continues to be a controversial issue. In the accounting literature, an important but unresolved question is whether accruals quality (AQ), an aspect of information risk and often proxied by the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) AQ measure, is a priced risk factor. Some argue in favor of a risk interpretation (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Aboody et al. 2005; Ogneva 2008; Kim and Qi 2010) , while others reject this view (e.g., Core et al. 2008; hereafter CGV) . Despite this ambiguity about AQ's risk status, a large literature continues to make inferences based on the assumption that AQ proxies for information risk (Appendix A lists a selection of recently published articles that view AQ as a risk factor). A better understanding of whether AQ's pricing is compatible with a risk interpretation therefore seems important. 5 For instance, we find no annual return premium to high AQ stocks during January 1971 -November 2003 and April 1971 -March 2002 (used by Francis et al. 2005 ), but we do find such a premium during January 1985-November 2003 (used by Aboody et al. 2005) . This inconsistency is due to the temporal distribution of the AQ effect during the calendar year-although the size of the January AQ premium is similar in the three periods, its non-January reversal is weaker in the January 1985-November 2003 period, resulting in the observed annual AQ premium for this period. When January is excluded, there is no annual AQ premium for any of these sample periods.
Finally, our results extend the January effect literature, most of which investigates the size effect in January. We show that another firm characteristic, accruals quality, also exhibits a powerful and independent January effect. In addition, like the small-firm January effect, the January AQ effect also seems to be driven, at least partly, by tax loss selling.
In Section II, we discuss prior literature on the pricing of AQ, the role of January in asset pricing, the relation between the January effect and tax loss selling, and the plausible link between AQ and tax loss selling. In Sections III, IV, and V, we discuss the methodology for our main portfolio tests, the results, and robustness checks, respectively. Section VI concludes.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH The Pricing of AQ
In the theoretical literature, there seems to be no consensus yet about whether accounting quality/information risk should be priced (Easley and O'Hara 2004; Hughes et al. 2007; Lambert et al. 2007; Armstrong et al. 2009; Christensen et al. 2010) . The empirical literature on this issue is equally inconclusive. In the interests of brevity, we confine our discussion of this literature to studies most relevant in our context-those that examine the pricing of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) AQ measure, a widely used proxy for information risk, using realized stock returns rather than estimates of implied cost of capital. Francis et al. (2005) conclude that AQ is a priced risk factor. Their inference is partially based on a positive factor loading on an AQ factor-mimicking portfolio in Fama and French (1993) timeseries regressions (after controlling for standard risk factors). However, as CGV point out, a positive factor loading in Fama and French (1993) regressions does not imply that the AQ factor bears a risk premium and is therefore insufficient to conclude that AQ is a priced risk factor.
To address this criticism, several studies examine two issues: whether returns of high AQ firms outperform those of low AQ firms and, if so, whether the outperformance of high AQ firms is due to risk. The overall evidence for both these issues is mixed and appears to depend on the specific sample period and/or methodology used. The reason(s) for such conflicting findings is not entirely clear. Aboody et al. (2005) find no relation between AQ and future returns, at least for a subset of insiders' buy-and-sell transactions (they do not test this relation for their full sample). They also find a statistically insignificant risk premium for an earnings-quality factor for all four of their earnings quality measures (including AQ), which is inconsistent with earnings quality being a priced risk factor. However, they attribute their weak results to ''noise contained in the observations, primarily from the [high earnings quality] firms'' (2005, 665) , and conclude that their overall evidence is still consistent with earnings quality being a priced risk factor. Ecker et al. (2006) do not directly test whether AQ predicts future returns. However, their AQ factor-mimicking portfolio (using daily returns) earns a positive daily return on average, indicating that AQ and future returns are highly positively correlated during their sample period. They do not test whether this outperformance of high AQ firms is due to risk.
Using monthly returns, CGV find a positive relation between AQ and future returns in the period tested by Aboody et al. (2005) , but no relation in the period tested by Francis et al. (2005) . 6 In contrast, using daily returns and daily/monthly rebalancing of equal-weighted portfolios, CGV find a strong positive relation between AQ and future returns for all sample periods examined. When testing for a risk premium to AQ, CGV find a risk premium only for the Aboody et al. (2005) period, and not for the other periods they examine. They argue, however, that the inconsistency in their results is due to bid-ask bias and/or transaction costs: upon rebalancing their portfolios annually instead of daily/ monthly, or dropping stocks with a price less than $5, they find that AQ neither predicts future returns nor bears a risk premium. CGV (2008, 14) acknowledge, however, that annual rebalancing is ''not completely satisfying'' because less frequent rebalancing (annual instead of monthly) may involve a loss of information about the pricing of AQ and bias their tests toward the null.
In contrast to CGV, two more recent studies find a positive relation between AQ and future returns as well as a positive risk premium to AQ after controlling for cash flow shocks (Ogneva 2008 ) and low-priced stocks (Kim and Qi 2010) . Ogneva (2008) argues that controlling for cash flow shocks-which affect realized returns-is important. Without such a control, the estimated effect of AQ on future realized returns could be biased downward because AQ is highly correlated with negative cash flow shocks. Kim and Qi (2010) repeat CGV's tests, but find a positive risk premium to AQ only when stocks less than $5 are excluded from their sample. Their findings appear to contradict those of CGV, who find some evidence of an AQ risk premium only when stocks less than $5 are included in the sample.
Despite such mixed evidence on AQ's risk status, the notion that information risk (proxied by AQ) is priced remains widespread. A large literature that examines the role of information risk in different settings continues to rely on AQ as a proxy. Even studies that do not use AQ as a risk proxy frequently rely on Francis et al.'s (2004 Francis et al.'s ( , 2005 conclusion that information risk is priced. Appendix A briefly describes recently published articles in top-tier accounting journals that bear on this topic. The fact that many researchers continue to view AQ as a proxy for information risk underscores the importance of resolving the ambiguity about AQ's pricing and its suitability as a proxy for information risk.
Although the reason(s) why return premiums to these firm characteristics are concentrated largely, and sometimes entirely, in January continues to be debated, researchers have often viewed such a calendar-year return pattern as being inconsistent with a risk explanation for several reasons (e.g. , Roll 1983b; Tinic and West 1984; Loughran 1997) . First, existing asset-pricing models do not predict any special role for the month of January, let alone explain why risk would be priced only in January. It is possible that risk varies during the year, for example, due to seasonal macroeconomic fluctuations (Ogden 2003) . However, such time-varying risk does not necessarily imply any unique role for January. Even if January were somehow riskier from the point of view of seasonality, it is hard to see why seasonal risk would be confined only to January (as for beta and idiosyncratic volatility) and why it would be so heavily concentrated during the first five trading days of January (as for size).
Second, there is little empirical evidence to support a risk explanation for the January effect. Ritter and Chopra (1989) and Kramer (1994) reject seasonal variation in CAPM-betas or risk premia as an explanation for the small-firm January effect. However, Kramer (1994) argues that a multifactor APT model (based on macroeconomic factors) with seasonal risk and risk premia can account for the small-firm January effect. His reasoning, however, does not explain why January rather than some other month plays such a unique role, or why seasonal risk would manifest itself exclusively in January (as for beta and idiosyncratic volatility). Several studies also test the ''information hypothesis,'' first proposed by Rozeff and Kinney (1976) , as a plausible risk explanation for the January effect. According to this hypothesis, since the majority of firms have December fiscal year-ends, the January effect reflects the greater uncertainty-and therefore the greater systematic risk-of these firms around the turn of the year. The greater uncertainty of these firms arises from the fact that they are expected to release important new financial information in January. These firms therefore earn higher returns in January to compensate for their higher risk. The overall evidence, however, is inconsistent with this hypothesis (Brauer and Chang 1990; Reinganum and Gangopadhyay 1991; Kim 2006) . 8 Third, a large literature shows that the January effect is caused at least partially by year-end tax loss selling by individual investors and/or by year-end ''window dressing'' by institutional money managers, consistent with the January effect being caused by mispricing rather than risk. We discuss the tax loss selling explanation in the next section. 9 We show that January also plays a critical role in AQ's pricing. Not only does AQ predict higher returns only in January, but also the complete reversal of this premium during the rest of the calendar year, along with the fact that the January premium at least partly reflects mispricing due to tax loss selling, is difficult to reconcile with the view that AQ proxies for systematic information risk. We discuss this issue more fully in presenting our results (Section IV).
8 Kim (2006) argues that the increase in information risk in January stems from the greater information uncertainty surrounding firms' annual financial results. However, he finds the January effect for both December and non-December fiscal year-end firms, which appears to be inconsistent with his hypothesis. His argument also does not explain why more than half of the small-firm January effect occurs during the first trading week in January; given that most December fiscal year-end firms do not disclose any new information during the first five trading days of January, it is hard to see how information uncertainty is resolved (and why prices rise) during this period. Moreover, since a majority of firms also have calendar quarter-ends and release important new financial information thereafter, the information risk story would also predict a January-like return effect around calendar quarter-ends. However, there is no evidence of systematically higher returns for small firms in these months. 9 Tax loss selling and window dressing are the two most commonly cited reasons for the January effect. According to the latter, because portfolio managers are evaluated in relation to their peers, they have an incentive to sell loser stocks and buy winner stocks around the turn of the year in order to make their portfolio holdings look better. The evidence on this hypothesis is less extensive and less compelling than that for tax loss selling (e.g., Athanassakos 1992; Griffiths and White 1993; Ng and Wang 2004) . Moreover, studies attempting to disentangle the tax loss selling and window dressing hypotheses tend to support the tax loss selling explanation (e.g., Sias and Starks 1997; Poterba and Weisbenner 2001; Grinblatt and Moskowitz 2004) .
Tax Loss Selling and the January Effect
The most widely investigated explanation for the January effect is tax loss selling at year-end by individual investors. The intuition for this argument is as follows. By realizing capital losses before year-end, individual investors can reduce their tax liability by using the realized losses to offset either their realized capital gains or their adjusted gross income. In addition, because the short-term capital gains tax rate is higher than the long-term rate (except during 1988-1990) , investors can maximize the ability of capital losses to shelter taxable income by realizing the losses while they are still short-term. On the other hand, investors have little incentive to realize capital gains because deferring gains reduces their tax burden. In particular, deferring short-term capital gains would qualify them to be taxed at the lower long-term capital gains tax rate when the gains are eventually realized. Thus, given the tax benefit of locking in capital losses, taxable investors sell their loser stocks by year-end and buy them back in January. In the absence of sufficient rational arbitrage, the stock price pressure resulting from such tax loss selling leads to positive abnormal returns in January for these loser stocks.
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A sizable literature documents evidence consistent with tax loss selling at least partly driving the small-firm January premium (e.g., Reinganum 1983; Roll 1983b; Sias and Starks 1997; Poterba and Weisbenner 2001) . However, tax loss selling does not seem to completely explain the premium. For example, countries with no capital gains taxes (e.g., Japan), and/or countries where the tax year does not end in December (e.g., the U.K. and Australia), also exhibit the January effect (Gultekin and Gultekin 1983; Berges et al. 1984; Kato and Schallheim 1985) .
AQ and Tax Loss Selling
Based on the evidence that tax loss selling causes a January effect, we hypothesize that January could play an important role in AQ's pricing due to the possibility that AQ proxies for tax loss selling. Roll (1983b) and Constantinides (1984) argue that since firms with greater stock return or operating volatility are statistically more likely to have experienced capital gains/losses in any given year, they would be more likely candidates for tax loss selling, all else equal. Brauer and Chang (1990) and Brickley et al. (1991) , among others, report that firms with greater return variance do indeed exhibit greater tax loss selling. Roll's (1983b) finding that the small-firm January effect is partly due to tax loss selling is also consistent with more volatile firms-such as small firms-being more likely candidates for tax loss selling.
The above reasoning implies that AQ, like size, may also proxy for tax loss selling because AQ happens to be very highly correlated with stock return volatility (Kim and Qi 2010) as well as operating volatility and the frequency of operating losses (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005) .
11 Moreover, high AQ firms exhibit poorer financial health, weaker internal controls, a greater likelihood of GAAP violations and accounting restatements, and a higher incidence of negative earnings surprises and/or negative cash flow shocks (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007; Ogneva 2008; Kim and Qi 2010) . For all these reasons, high AQ firms are statistically more likely to experience negative stock returns, and therefore capital losses for tax purposes, in any given year.
Consistent with AQ proxying for tax loss selling, we find that (1) the pricing of AQ displays a strong and independent January effect; (2) an AQ premium is observed only in January; and (3) the size of the January AQ premium varies positively with other proxies for tax loss selling. This evidence suggests that the AQ premium in January is caused (at least partly) by mispricing attributable to tax loss selling around the turn of the year.
III. DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODOLOGY

Data
For our portfolio tests, the full sample period runs from January 1971 through March 2008.
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The sample includes all common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during our sample period, subject to data requirements for the calculation of our variables. Monthly and daily stock returns and prices are obtained from CRSP, annual accounting data are obtained from Compustat, and the Fama and French (1993) factors, the risk-free rate, and the momentum factor are obtained from Kenneth French's website. We obtain institutional ownership data from the CDA/ Spectrum institutional money manager holdings (13-F) database, while earnings announcement dates are from I/B/E/S. Our illiquidity measure, based on Amihud (2002) , is obtained from Joel Hasbrouck's website. 13 We describe below the measurement of our main variables, AQ and SIZE. All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
Measurement of AQ and SIZE
We compute AQ following Francis et al. (2005) . Their measure of AQ is based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, augmented with the change in revenue and the level of property, plant, and equipment (PPE). We begin by estimating a regression of total current accruals (TCA) on lagged, current, and future cash flows (CFO) plus the change in revenue and the level of PPE. All variables are deflated by average total assets.
where: We estimate Equation (1) in the cross-section each year for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year. Industries are defined using Fama and French's (1997) 48-industry classification. Estimation of Equation (1) generates firm-and year-specific residuals. For each firm j, we calculate accruals quality (AQ) for year t as the standard deviation of firm-specific residuals from year tÀ4 through year t (i.e., the five-year standard deviation). Accruals quality is assumed to be poorer when the standard deviation of the residuals (AQ) is higher. For each firm, AQ is measured at every fiscal year-end and is used to form portfolios starting three months after the fiscal year-end. For example, we use the value of AQ for year t calculated for a firm with a December fiscal year-end to form portfolios starting in April of year tþ1. The next section describes the portfolio formation procedure.
We compute SIZE monthly for each firm as the market capitalization of the firm at the end of the month prior to portfolio formation. Market capitalization is defined as the share price times the number of common shares outstanding on the last trading day of the month. For example, SIZE calculated at the end of March of year t is used to form portfolios in April of year t. Although AQ is calculated annually, we compute SIZE monthly in order to better control for size and isolate the effect of AQ on stock returns.
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Portfolio Formation
In any given month, we form portfolios on AQ and/or SIZE using all firms for which we have returns in that particular month. For example, based on the measurement of AQ and SIZE described above, if we sort firms on AQ and SIZE in April 2000, we effectively sort on AQ values calculated between January 1999 and December 1999 (depending on a firm's fiscal year-end), and we sort on SIZE measured as of the end of March 2000.
Firms are sorted into deciles when forming portfolios on AQ alone. When forming portfolios on both AQ and SIZE, we sort firms into quintiles, resulting in a total of 25 AQ 3 SIZE portfolios each month. All reported results are based on independent portfolio sorts on AQ and SIZE; results using conditional sorts are similar.
Computation of Abnormal Returns
After forming portfolios every month as described above, we compute monthly (daily) equalweighted and value-weighted portfolio returns. Thus, for each portfolio, we obtain 447 (9,399) monthly (daily) returns over our full sample period from January 1971 to March 2008. To compute the average monthly (daily) abnormal return for each portfolio during the sample period, we estimate four-factor Fama and French (1993) time-series regressions for each portfolio using the 447 (9,399) monthly (daily) portfolio returns. That is, for each portfolio, we estimate the following model:
where R p represents the equal-weighted or value-weighted monthly (daily) return for the portfolio and R f is the monthly (daily) yield of the one-month Treasury bill. The four contemporaneous independent variables are the monthly (daily) excess return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio (R m À R f ), the difference in monthly (daily) returns to value-weighted portfolios containing small-and large-firm stocks (SMB), the difference in monthly (daily) returns to value-weighted portfolios containing high and low book-to-market stocks (HML), and the difference in monthly (daily) returns to value-weighted portfolios containing firms with high and low prior momentum (UMD). 15 The intercept b 0 represents the average monthly (daily) abnormal return to the relevant portfolio.
We also estimate Equation (2) for AQ hedge portfolios that are long in the highest AQ portfolio and short in the lowest AQ portfolio, using the monthly (daily) hedge portfolio return as the dependent variable. In these regressions, our primary variable of interest is the estimated intercept because it can be interpreted as the average monthly (daily) abnormal return generated by the AQ hedge portfolio over the sample period.
Controls
Since the bid-ask bias in low-priced stocks is likely to be of particular concern around the turn of the year (Blume and Stambaugh 1983; Keim 1989) , we try to control for it in three different ways. First, we report value-weighted portfolio returns. Value-weighting considerably mitigates the bid-ask bias in a non-arbitrary manner (Roll 1983a; Blume and Stambaugh 1983) . However, a possible disadvantage is that value-weighting likely understates the AQ effect because the latter is much stronger among smaller stocks, perhaps for reasons that have nothing to do with bid-ask bias. Second, when using daily returns, we report equal-weighted portfolio returns after removing stocks priced lower than $1 for which the bias is likely to be most severe (Ball et al. 1995) . Finally, we explicitly control for both stock price and illiquidity in our cross-sectional regression tests to isolate this bias.
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In our cross-sectional tests, we also control for the beta, dividend yield, book-to-market, momentum, and idiosyncratic volatility January effects. Incorporating these controls in a crosssectional framework avoids the practical problem of inadequately small portfolio sizes when portfolios are formed on more than three variables. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables used in this study.
IV. RESULTS
The AQ Effect: January versus Non-January
We begin by documenting how AQ spreads stock returns on an annual basis and then examine the effect of seasonality on the predictive ability of AQ. The first two columns of Table 2 show equal-and value-weighted monthly abnormal returns to an AQ hedge portfolio based on AQ deciles (AQ10 À AQ1). For simplicity, we do not tabulate the estimated coefficients for the three Fama and French (1993) factors and momentum. We evaluate statistical significance using Newey-West standard errors with two lags to correct for serial correlation in monthly portfolio returns. All reported significance tests are two-tailed.
There is no evidence that AQ predicts future returns when we use all calendar months in the sample period. The average equal-and value-weighted abnormal returns to the AQ hedge portfolio are 0.43 percent and À0.01 percent per month, respectively, and both are statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p ¼ 0.13 and 0.96, respectively).
Next, we examine the AQ hedge portfolio abnormal return for January and all non-January months, both individually and taken together. Now we observe an AQ premium, but it is entirely a January phenomenon and seems to reverse completely over the rest of the calendar year such that AQ does not spread annual returns. In January, the equal-weighted (value-weighted) abnormal return is an economically large 6.94 percent (2.44 percent) and statistically significant (p , 0.01 and p ¼ 0.04, 16 Dropping stocks less than $5 instead leads to similar inferences. In our tests, excluding low-priced stocks reduces the magnitude of portfolio returns. This is consistent with an overstatement of portfolio returns due to bid-ask bias among low-priced stocks, a finding documented by many prior studies (e.g., Blume and Stambaugh 1983) as well as by CGV. Unlike these studies, Kim and Qi (2010) find that the return premium to AQ increases (rather than decreases) when stocks less than $5 are excluded from the sample. respectively). However, for the non-January months taken together, the average equal-weighted (value-weighted) abnormal return is À0.25 percent (À0.33 percent) per month but insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels (p ¼ 0.15 in both cases). (Later, we show that the statistical insignificance of the non-January AQ discount is due to the confounding effect of firm size. Once we control for size, the non-January reversal of the January AQ premium is clearly visible and statistically significant.) More tellingly, the abnormal return is significantly positive only in January. In every other calendar month, the abnormal return is either zero or negative. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All significance tests are two-tailed. This table presents the average monthly equal-weighted and value-weighted abnormal returns to a hedge portfolio formed on AQ (AQ10 À AQ1) and the average monthly return for an AQ factor-mimicking portfolio (AQFactor). To calculate the hedge portfolio returns, AQ deciles are formed each month. The average monthly hedge portfolio abnormal return is the intercept in a time-series regression of the monthly hedge portfolio return on the monthly Fama and French (1993) factors (R m À R f , SMB, HML) and the monthly momentum factor (UMD). To calculate the AQFactor, the sample is sorted into AQ quintiles at the beginning of each month. The AQFactor return for the month is the difference in equalweighted returns between the top two quintiles and the bottom two quintiles. Returns are presented in percentages. tstatistics, shown in parentheses below the return, are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with two lags. The sample period runs from January 1971 to March 2008. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
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To test whether AQ is a risk factor, Francis et al. (2005) construct a factor-mimicking portfolio based on AQ (AQFactor). 18 The third column in Table 2 shows that this factor-mimicking portfolio also displays a strong January effect. Moreover, the AQFactor return is significantly positive only in January (return ¼ 4.44 percent, p , 0.01). For all calendar months taken together, for all non-January months taken together, and for any individual non-January month, the AQFactor return is never significantly positive.
Figure 1, Panel A shows that the equal-weighted AQ January effect is not driven solely by the two extreme AQ deciles. The returns are monotonically increasing across deciles in January. For all other calendar months, returns across AQ deciles are more or less similar and there is no upward trend. For the value-weighted AQ decile returns in January (Figure 1, Panel B) , the increase across deciles is more gradual and non-monotonic, highlighting the importance of firm size for the January AQ premium.
Is the January AQ Premium Compensation for Risk?
Given the apparent lack of any theoretical or empirical justification for systematic risk to be priced primarily in January, the fact that high AQ firms earn higher returns only in January strongly suggests that AQ may not reflect systematic risk. We now discuss several additional findings that, when considered together with the results above, reinforce the impression that AQ is unlikely to be proxying for risk.
First, we find that the January AQ premium is extremely stable from year to year. The equalweighted January return on an AQ hedge portfolio (based on deciles) is positive in 35 of the 38 sample years, with a high average return of 8.42 percent (Table 3 ) and a relatively low standard deviation of 8.2 percent (not tabulated). Such a persistently positive return to a trading strategy is more indicative of mispricing than of risk. This is because, if the average January premium (over time) earned by the AQ hedge portfolio were compensation for bearing systematic risk, then one would expect the portfolio to periodically experience losses over a 38-year period. Otherwise, it is not clear in what sense such a portfolio is risky (see, for example, Lakonishok et al. [1994] and Bernard et al. [1997] for further discussion of this issue).
Second, we find that about half of the January AQ effect occurs during the first trading week of January. Table 3 shows equal-and value-weighted returns to an AQ hedge portfolio for January, the first trading day in January, and the first five trading days in January. For each firm in AQ deciles 1 and 10, we compute buy-and-hold returns over the five-day period. We then average the five-day buy-and-hold return across all firms in the relevant portfolio. The five-day AQ hedge portfolio return is the difference between the five-day return for decile 10 and the five-day return for decile 1. The value-weighted portfolio returns are based on firms' market capitalization as of the last trading day of the preceding December.
Using either means or medians, about 50 percent of the January return to the equal-weighted AQ hedge portfolio occurs during the first trading week in January, while about 17 percent of it occurs on the first trading day of the year. Such a lopsided concentration of the AQ premium in early January is difficult to reconcile with a risk explanation. Even if the January premium were compensation for some kind of seasonal risk that manifests itself only in January (although there does not appear to be any justification in the literature for such a notion of risk), one would expect the premium to be spread uniformly throughout January-i.e., the proportion of the premium earned in the first five trading days would only be about 23.8 percent rather than the observed 50 percent (assuming an average of 21 trading days per month).
Third, we find that the January AQ premium reverses itself completely over the rest of the calendar year, such that there is no AQ premium on an annual basis. This again suggests that the January AQ premium is due to a temporary mispricing that subsequently corrects itself. If the premium were due to some kind of January risk, then one would not expect it to subsequently reverse.
Fourth, we find that the January AQ premium is increasing in tax loss selling, consistent with the January AQ premium being caused (at least partly) by mispricing related to tax loss selling around the turn of the year (discussed later in this section).
Fifth, we find evidence inconsistent with the January AQ premium being due to risk arising from information uncertainty around the turn of the year (see Section V).
Finally, note that the calendar-year pricing of AQ is less consistent with a risk explanation than is the pricing of either size (e.g., Keim 1983) or book-to-market (e.g., Loughran 1997), in two fundamental ways. Unlike the AQ premium, the size and book-to-market premiums occur in January as well as in the non-January period-i.e., they are not confined only to January, even though a large proportion of the annual premium occurs in January. Also unlike AQ, both size and book-to-market exhibit economically large premiums on an annual basis-i.e., the size and bookto-market January premiums do not reverse over the rest of the calendar year.
The above findings, especially when taken together, are difficult to reconcile with a risk interpretation of AQ, given the current theoretical and empirical understanding of risk in the literature. Rather, they suggest that the January AQ premium reflects mispricing, at least partly due to tax loss selling. We caution, however, that our findings should not be taken as conclusive evidence against the risk argument. Although the tests we use are standard in the asset-pricing literature, the equilibrium returns model they assume could be misspecified if researchers' current understanding of risk is somehow incomplete or flawed. At a minimum, however, any potential risk explanation for AQ must now satisfactorily explain how risk is compatible with the collective evidence presented here. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All significance tests are two-tailed. This table presents the mean and median raw returns to a hedge portfolio formed on AQ (AQ10 À AQ1) for the entire month of January, the first trading day in January, and the first five trading days in January. AQ deciles are formed each month. To calculate the hedge portfolio return for the first five trading days in January, we compute the five-day buy-andhold return for each firm, and then compute the equal-or value-weighted hedge portfolio return for the five-day period.
Returns are presented in percentages. t-statistics, shown in parentheses below the return, are calculated using NeweyWest standard errors with two lags. The sample period runs from January 1971 to March 2008. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Firm Size and the January AQ Effect
In Table 4 , we examine how firm size influences the relation between AQ and future stock returns. In addition to clarifying how the AQ effect differs between small and large firms, partitioning on size also controls for the January size anomaly. The results show that the January AQ premium is independent of firm size and occurs in four out of five size quintiles. Conversely, for the non-January period, not only is there is no AQ premium for any size quintile, but we see a significant AQ discount in three out of five size quintiles.
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As described earlier, we independently sort all firms into size and AQ quintiles each month. For each size quintile, Table 4 reports the equal-and value-weighted abnormal return to an AQ hedge portfolio based on the two extreme quintiles (AQ5 À AQ1). For simplicity, we only discuss the results for equal-weighted portfolios, as the value-weighted results are generally similar. In Panel A, for all calendar months taken together, the average monthly AQ abnormal hedge return is significantly positive only for the smallest size quintile (return ¼ 0.53 percent, p ¼ 0.05). However, this annual AQ effect is entirely driven by January. When January is excluded, the AQ abnormal return becomes insignificantly different from zero (return ¼ 0.04 percent, p ¼ 0.87).
The January AQ effect remains robust after controlling for size, and is positive and statistically significant in four of the five size quintiles. For the smallest size quintile, the January AQ premium is a large 6.09 percent (p , 0.01), which decreases to 0.76 percent (p ¼ 0.19) for the largest size quintile. Thus, although the January AQ effect is considerably stronger for smaller stocks, it is not driven by the January size anomaly.
For the non-January period, we now observe a statistically significant AQ discount in three of the five size quintiles-i.e., for these size quintiles, AQ is negatively related to future returns. Given the generally insignificant abnormal returns to AQ on an annual basis, this finding suggests that the January AQ effect reverses itself completely during the rest of the calendar year. Recall that this reversal of the January AQ premium is statistically insignificant in the absence of a size control (Table 2) . Controlling for size is therefore important for a clearer understanding of how the pricing of AQ varies during the year.
Using Daily Instead of Monthly Returns
We repeated the above tests using daily returns because some prior studies (e.g., CGV) also use daily returns to test whether AQ is priced. The results, shown in Table 5 , are similar to those using monthly returns. For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss these results.
Cross-Sectional Regressions
Our results for the January AQ premium are robust to various additional controls. In Table 6 , we employ monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions to simultaneously control for several firm characteristics that are known to be associated with January returns: firm size (SIZE; e.g., Keim 1983), the CAPM beta (BETA; e.g., Tinic and West 1984), book-to-market (BM; e.g., Loughran 1997), dividend yield (YIELD; e.g., Keim 1986), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL; e.g., Doran et al. 2010) , stock price (PRICE; e.g., Bhardwaj and Brooks 1992) , and momentum (MOM; e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) . We also add a proxy for illiquidity (ILLIQ; based on Amihud [2002] ) as an additional control for market microstructure effects and/or liquidity risk. AQ and 19 Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) argue that the small-firm January premium is a stock price phenomenon rather than a size phenomenon, i.e., size plays no role in the January premium after controlling for stock price. We emphasize the role of size in our tests to be consistent with the literature on the January effect, which continues to focus on size rather than stock price. We do, however, control for stock price in both our cross-sectional tests and in unreported portfolio tests, and find that the January AQ premium is not subsumed by stock price. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All significance tests are two-tailed. This table shows, for each size quintile, the average monthly abnormal return for the extreme AQ quintiles (AQ1 and AQ5), and the AQ hedge portfolio (AQ5 À AQ1). AQ and SIZE quintiles are formed monthly using independent sorts. The average monthly portfolio abnormal return is the intercept in a time-series regression of the monthly portfolio excess return on the monthly Fama and French (1993) YIELD are computed at fiscal year-end (and mapped to returns three months later), ILLIQ is measured at calendar year-end, and all other variables are computed every month. Each month, firmspecific returns are regressed on firm-specific, lagged independent variables, as follows:
The monthly coefficient estimates from Equation (3) are then averaged over the sample period to obtain the mean coefficient estimates. Statistical significance of the mean coefficient estimates is based on Newey-West standard errors (with two lags) of the monthly coefficient estimates to adjust for autocorrelation in the latter. All significance tests are two-tailed. Note that our sample period for *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All significance tests are two-tailed. This table shows the average daily abnormal returns for a hedge portfolio formed on AQ (Panel A) or AQ and SIZE (Panel B). In Panel A, AQ deciles are formed each month. In Panel B, AQ and SIZE quintiles are formed monthly using independent sorts. The average daily hedge portfolio abnormal return is the intercept in a time-series regression of the daily hedge portfolio return on the daily Fama and French (1993) factors (R m À R f , SMB, HML) and the daily momentum factor (UMD). Returns are presented in percentages. To mitigate bid-ask bias in computing equal-weighted portfolio returns, stocks with a price of less than $1 at the beginning of each month are dropped from the sample. t-statistics, shown in parentheses below the return, are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with five lags. The sample period runs from January 1971 to March 2008. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
TABLE 6
Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regressions
All Months (n ¼ 432) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All significance tests are two-tailed. This table presents the time-series mean coefficients from monthly cross-sectional regressions using all monthly returns (Columns 1-3), January returns (Columns 4-6), and nonJanuary returns (Columns 7-9). The dependent variable is monthly returns. All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels; the fiscal year-end explanatory variables are mapped to returns three months later. Table 6 are consistent with the portfolio results. First, when using all calendar months (columns 1-3), the estimated coefficient on AQ is never significantly different from zeroi.e., there is no annual AQ premium. Second, the estimated AQ coefficient is always strongly positive and highly significant in January (columns 4-6). Third, the estimated coefficient on AQ is negative in non-January months (columns 7-9), unless momentum is included in the specification. The reason why momentum subsumes the non-January AQ discount is unclear.
20 Inferences are also similar using decile ranks for the independent variables (untabulated).
Does Tax Loss Selling Explain the January AQ Effect?
Earlier, we hypothesized that AQ could possibly proxy for the incidence of tax loss selling. If tax loss selling drives the January AQ premium, then one would expect (1) the January AQ premium to be greater for firms with greater tax loss selling; and (2) the effect of tax loss selling on the January AQ premium to be greater for firms with lower institutional ownership. This is because tax loss selling is commonly attributed to selling by taxable individual investors rather than institutional investors (e.g., Ritter 1988; Sias and Starks 1997) .
To proxy for the likelihood of tax loss selling in a particular firm, we employ two widely used measures in the January effect literature. The first measure is the firm's buy-and-hold return over the previous calendar year, excluding the last five trading days in December (Roll 1983b; Sias and Starks 1997; Poterba and Weisbenner 2001) . The idea here is that the lower a firm's return in the prior year, the greater would be the likelihood of tax loss selling in the firm at the end of the year. For ease of interpretation, we multiply the prior year's return by À1 and call this variable ARET; thus, the likelihood of tax loss selling is increasing in ARET.
The second measure attempts to capture the idea that the greater the short-term capital loss in a particular year, the greater is the probability of tax loss selling. Following Reinganum (1983) and Chang and Pinegar (1986) , we measure the likelihood of a short-term capital loss by using the ratio of the stock price on the last trading day of the year (excluding the last five trading days) and the maximum stock price between January 1 and the last trading day of the year (excluding the last five trading days). We define ''short-term'' as the entire calendar year because the IRS definition of a short-term holding period is 12 months for the majority of our sample period. By construction, this ratio varies between 0 and 1, with a lower value indicating a greater likelihood of tax loss selling. For ease of interpretation, we multiply this ratio by À1 and call the resulting variable PTLS; thus, similar to ARET, the likelihood of tax loss selling is expected to be increasing in PTLS.
21 20 The pricing of the other firm characteristics is also consistent with prior research; a large proportion of the size or book-to-market premium occurs in January (e.g., Keim 1983; Loughran 1997) , beta is priced only in January (e.g., Tinic and West 1984), idiosyncratic volatility is priced positively in January and negatively in the nonJanuary period (Doran et al. 2010) , momentum is priced negatively in January and positively in the non-January period (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), stock price is negatively correlated with January returns (e.g., Bhardwaj and Brooks 1992) , and high-dividend firms earn higher returns in January (Keim 1986 ). 21 Note that our PTLS measure differs slightly from Reinganum (1983) in two ways. First, he uses a six-month period (July 1-December 31) as his short-term holding period because the IRS holding period was six months for most of his sample period (the holding period was six months from 1971 to 1976 and from July 1984 to 1987, nine months for 1977, and 12 months for the remainder of our sample period). Second, he only excludes the last trading day in December to compute his measure, whereas we exclude the last five trading days. We do this to be consistent with the recent literature on the January effect (e.g., Sias and Starks 1997; Poterba and Weisbenner 2001) . However, inferences are similar if we instead exclude only the last trading day in December.
As with our main cross-sectional tests, we use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology for the tax loss selling tests. We estimate the following specification:
where TLS is the probability of tax loss selling in the previous year (either ARET or PTLS). If the January AQ premium is caused by the stock price effects of tax loss selling, then the coefficient on AQ should vary positively with tax loss selling-i.e., the coefficient on b 3 in Equation (4) should be positive. Given this directional prediction, the significance test for b 3 is one-tailed. Table 7 shows that the January AQ premium indeed increases with tax loss selling. The AQ 3 TLS interaction is positive and statistically significant using both ARET (column 2, est. coeff. ¼ 0.22, p ¼ 0.03) and PTLS (column 3, est. coeff. ¼ 0.976, p , 0.01) as proxies for tax loss selling. To get a sense for the economic significance of this result, it is helpful to see how the January AQ premium varies with tax loss selling. Using ARET, the January AQ premium increases by 63 percent as we move from quartile 1 to quartile 3 of ARET (the AQ coefficient goes from 0.185 to 0.301).
22 Using PTLS, the result is even stronger: the AQ coefficient is almost 0 for quartile 1 of PTLS-i.e., there is no January AQ premium when tax loss selling is low-and increases to 0.282 for quartile 3 of PTLS. In untabulated tests using rank regressions to examine the issue of economic significance (with decile ranks scaled between 0 and 1), the results are also striking: for both ARET and PTLS, the AQ 3 TLS interaction remains positive and significant as before, but the coefficient on AQ now becomes insignificant or negative-i.e., there is no January AQ premium when there is no tax loss selling (for decile rank 0). Overall, therefore, tax loss selling appears to play an economically important role in the January AQ premium. However, the fact that an AQ premium is observed in some specifications even when tax loss selling is low (for example, for quartile 1 of ARET in column 2 of Table 7) suggests that tax loss selling is not a complete explanation for the January AQ premium.
Next, we examine whether institutional ownership affects the relation between tax loss selling and the January AQ effect. At the end of every December, we form three institutional ownership (IO) portfolios, and then estimate Equation (4) separately for each IO portfolio. IO is defined as the sum of all institutional holdings of the stock scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Since institutional holdings are reported every calendar quarter, we use the most recent holdings for a firm prior to December 1. The number of outstanding shares is measured at the end of the month in which ownership data are reported. As in prior research, we assume that stocks without any reported 13-F institutional holdings have no institutional ownership. Table 8 shows that, using either ARET or PTLS, the January AQ premium is increasing in tax loss selling (i.e., the AQ 3 TLS interaction is positive) only for firms with low institutional ownership (columns 1 and 4). This is consistent with tax loss selling at least partly causing the January AQ premium, because tax loss selling is likely to be most prevalent in firms with low institutional ownership. However, for the medium and high IO portfolios (columns 2-3 and 5-6), there seems to be no relation between tax loss selling and the January AQ effect (the AQ 3 TLS interaction is insignificant), despite the fact that these portfolios also exhibit an AQ premium (albeit about half the size of that for the low IO portfolio; untabulated). This latter finding again suggests that tax loss selling does not fully explain the AQ premium. Pursuing a comprehensive explanation of the January AQ premium, however, is beyond the scope of this study and we leave this question for future research. 22 The AQ coefficient is computed using the estimated regression coefficients and Table 9 reports evidence that the information hypothesis (discussed in Section II) is unlikely to explain the January AQ effect. First, the magnitude of the January AQ effect is unaffected when December year-end firms (i.e., firms with upcoming annual financial information in January) are dropped from the sample, as the AQ coefficient is similar in columns 1 and 2. Second, the magnitude of the January AQ premium is also unaffected if firms with fiscal
V. ADDITIONAL TESTS Information Hypothesis
TABLE 7
Tax Loss Selling and the January AQ Effect
(1) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All significance tests are two-tailed except for AQ 3 TLS (which is one-tailed). This table presents the time-series mean coefficients from monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions using January observations only. The dependent variable is monthly returns. All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels; the fiscal year-end explanatory variables are mapped to returns three months later. The coefficients on PRICE and ILLIQ are multiplied by 100. t-statistics, shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, are based on Newey-West standard errors with two lags. The sample period runs from January 1971 to December 2006. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
quarters ending in December (regardless of whether their fiscal year ends in December-i.e., firms with upcoming annual or quarterly financial information in January) are dropped from the sample, as the AQ coefficient is similar in columns 1 and 3. Finally, the magnitude of the AQ premium is also unaffected if all observations with January earnings announcements, whether 
Tax Loss Selling (TLS)
Proxy is ARET Proxy is PTLS annual or quarterly, are dropped from the sample, as the AQ coefficient is similar in columns 1 and 4.
Alternative Measures of Accruals Quality
To shed light on the generalizability of our results for AQ, we examine two other commonly used measures of accruals quality: (1) the absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals (Kothari et al. 2005) , and (2) the absolute value of the residual from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The results are qualitatively similar to those for AQ-i.e., there is no annual premium in both cases, both proxies predict higher abnormal returns only in January, and the January premium in both cases is increasing in tax loss selling (untabulated). Thus, our results
TABLE 9
Testing the Information Hypothesis
Full Sample (Same as Column 5 in Table 6 
Controlling for Cash Flow Shocks
Since cash flow shocks affect realized returns and AQ is empirically highly correlated with negative cash flow shocks, Ogneva (2008) argues that controlling for cash flow shocks is important when realized returns are used as a proxy for expected returns in asset-pricing tests on AQ. To examine whether cash flow shocks affect our results, we follow Ogneva (2008) and control for such shocks using the scaled AQ measure (SAQ). SAQ is computed as AQ scaled by average absolute accruals estimated over years tÀ4 through t (the period over which AQ is measured). 24 In untabulated results, we find that the main results in Table 6 are insensitive to controlling for cash flow shocks; like AQ, SAQ predicts higher returns only in January.
Daniel and Titman (1997) Test
Finally, we use the Daniel and Titman (1997) approach to shed more light on whether AQ reflects risk or mispricing. Specifically, we examine the extent to which average returns are generated by the AQ factor loading (estimated using four-factor Fama-French regressions including the AQFactor) rather than the firm characteristic AQ.
25 If the AQ factor proxies for risk, then one would expect variation in the AQ factor loading rather than AQ to capture the cross-section of returns. Using 25 (5 3 5) portfolios sorted on AQ and the AQ factor loading, we find that increasing the AQ factor loading has no effect on average returns within any AQ portfolio. However, increasing AQ predicts returns for three of the five AQ factor loading portfolios (untabulated). Thus, any return premium to AQ appears to be driven by the AQ characteristic and not by sensitivity to an aggregate risk factor proxied by the AQ factor. Like our seasonality results, these findings are difficult to reconcile with AQ being a unique and priced risk factor.
VI. CONCLUSION
As an alternative way to shed light on the continuing debate over whether accruals quality is a priced risk factor, we examine the calendar-year pricing of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality measure (AQ), a widely used proxy for accruals quality. Our results indicate that AQ is positively related to future abnormal stock returns only in January. Conversely, in non-January months, AQ is negatively correlated with future returns such that there is no AQ premium (typically) on an annual basis. Thus, any AQ premium appears entirely due to the month of January. Moreover, about half of the January premium occurs during the first five trading days in January. The January AQ premium is stable across time and across different sample periods, occurs for both small and large firms, and cannot be explained by the other January effects documented by prior literature. We also find that the January AQ premium varies positively with the likelihood of tax loss selling around the turn of the year, consistent with the premium reflecting, at least partly, the stock price effects of tax loss selling. 23 The result for performance-adjusted abnormal accruals is not inconsistent with the well-known accrual anomaly; they predict negative returns on an annual basis and in the non-January period, but positive returns in January. 24 Ogneva (2008) uses direct proxies as well as the scaled AQ measure to control for cash flow shocks. To be conservative, we use the scaled AQ measure because she seems to find stronger results with this measure (in support of AQ as a risk factor). 25 Because we find no annual premium to AQ for our full sample period, we perform this test for the January 1985-November 2003 sample period, during which AQ does predict future returns on an annual basis. Note that unless an annual return premium is observed, the Daniel and Titman (1997) The following selection of published articles in top-tier accounting journals shows that many researchers continue to view the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) AQ measure as a proxy for information risk, despite the uncertainty about AQ's risk status. Articles are listed alphabetically.
Articles that (1) test and conclude that AQ proxies for information risk; (2) use AQ as a proxy for information risk in different settings; or (3) make inferences based on the assumption that AQ proxies for information risk are shown below.
& Aboody et al. (2005) examine whether earnings quality is priced (using AQ as one measure of earnings quality) and whether insiders earn greater profits when they trade on stocks with a higher exposure to the earnings quality risk factor. They conclude that they find ''evidence consistent with pricing of the earnings quality factor and insiders trading more profitably in firms with higher exposure to that factor'' (Aboody et al. 2005, 651) . & Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) examine whether ineffective internal control results in less reliable financial reporting, thus increasing the information risk faced by investors that manifests in a higher cost of equity. They state: ''Prior research suggests that firms with lowquality accruals have a higher cost of equity '' (Ashbaugh- Skaife et al. 2009, 36) . They examine whether poor internal controls have an incremental effect on the cost of equity after controlling for AQ. & Bharath et al. (2008) analyze the impact of borrower accounting quality on debt contracting.
Their composite measure of accounting quality incorporates AQ. They state that ''an interpretation of our results could be that stringent contract terms for low accounting quality borrowers reflect lenders' compensation for information risk. This interpretation is consistent with Easley et al. (2002) , Easley and O'Hara (2003) , and Francis et al. (2005) '' (Bharath et al. 2008, 4) . They also mention that their evidence ''further supports the hypothesis that information risk is a priced source of risk distinct from default risk'' (Bharath et al. 2008, 5) . & Chen et al. (2007) examine whether accruals quality (proxied by AQ) is a priced information risk factor in a dividend change setting. They conclude: ''Overall, we interpret our results as being consistent with investors treating the information risk associated with the precision of financial statement information as a priced risk factor, with both the precision and pricing changing in predictable directions around dividend changes'' (Chen et al. 2007, 1-2) . & Ecker et al. (2006) analyze a returns-based measure of earnings quality estimated from firmspecific asset-pricing regressions augmented by an earnings-quality-mimicking factor (the AQ factor). They state: ''Empirical support for the view that earnings quality as measured by accruals quality is priced is provided by Francis et al. (2005) . . . Thus, conditioning on theory that shows information uncertainty is a priced risk factor, and on Francis et al.'s (2005) empirical evidence that the market prices information risk as captured by earnings quality measured by AQ, we view e-loadings as capturing the sensitivity of stock returns to earnings quality'' (Ecker et al. 2006, 750-751) .
& Francis et al. (2008a) examine the link between CEO reputation and earnings quality and find that firms with reputed CEOs have poorer earnings quality. They note the following implication of this finding: ' and Aboody et al. (2005) argue that poor earnings quality, as proxied by the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of earnings quality [i.e., AQ] and absolute discretionary accruals, is associated with a higher cost of equity and debt capital and greater rents appropriated by insiders. On the basis of these findings, we argue that if reputed CEOs influence earnings quality to make reported earnings look good to maintain their reputations, cost of capital and insider rent appropriation increase'' (Francis et al. 2008, 142) . examine the relation between the cost of equity capital and seven earnings attributes, including accruals quality (proxied by AQ). They conclude: ''On the whole, the weight of the evidence suggests that, among the seven attributes we consider, accrual quality is the dominant attribute in terms of cost of equity effects'' (Francis et al. , 1006 . examine whether investors price accruals quality, a proxy for information risk. They state: ''Measuring accruals quality (AQ) as the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating current accruals to cash flows, we find that poorer AQ is associated with larger costs of debt and equity'' (Francis et al. 2005, 295) . & Francis et al. (2008b) examine the relation between voluntary disclosure and earnings quality, and the pricing effects of voluntary disclosure unconditionally and conditional on earnings quality. Their composite measure of earnings quality incorporates AQ. They conclude: ''On the whole, our results show that earnings quality has a first-order effect on cost of capital, while voluntary disclosure has no significant and distinct influence on the cost of capital'' (Francis et al. 2008, 81) . & Kim and Qi (2010) examine whether AQ is a priced risk factor and how the pricing of AQ varies with macroeconomic conditions. They conclude that their results ''suggest that AQ contributes to the cost of equity capital and that its pricing effect is associated with fundamental risk'' (Kim and Qi 2010, 937) . & Kravet and Shevlin (2009) examine the association between accounting restatements and the pricing of information risk. They use AQ as a proxy for information risk and the discretionary component of AQ as a proxy for discretionary information risk. They ''find that the negative market reaction resulting from restatements documented in prior literature is associated with the increase in the pricing of discretionary information risk'' (Kravet and Shevlin 2009, 3) . & Krishnan et al. (2008) investigate whether inventory policy affects information risk that is priced by the market after controlling for AQ. They assert that ' show that accruals quality is priced by the market as a systematic factor and that the market demands higher returns from firms with poorer accruals quality, consistent with Easley and O'Hara (2004) '' (Krishnan et al. 2008, 371) . The authors conclude that their ''results imply that investors price the inventory policy as a proxy for unobservable underlying systematic risk that is incremental to information risk captured by accruals quality [AQ]'' (Krishnan et al. 2008, 397) . & Lee and Masulis (2009) investigate the impact of accruals quality (proxied by AQ) on underwriter gross spreads during SEOs. They argue that ''poor accruals quality by an issuer leads to high information risk, because it raises investor uncertainty and asymmetric information between the issuer and outside investors, which SEO announcements could exacerbate'' (Lee and Masulis 2009, 452) . examine whether certain firm characteristics, including earnings quality, are determinants of analysts' risk ratings. In motivating the use of earnings quality (proxied by
